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The problem analyzed is how to provide most efficiently in
a weapon, in an economic sense, high reliability - defined
as the probability of the weapon to operate properly whenever,
within its prescribed service life, it is called upon to do so.
The problem is discussed in the context of a re-entry body (weapon)
for a strategic missile. A method is proposed for building up a
supply curve of initial (when new) reliability, using a generalized
Lagrange multiplier method. Selection of the reliability goal
based upon the value of the product is discussed. A model is also
developed for maintenance of reliability in the presence of degrada-
tion with time. The nature of this latter question is the acceptance
of degradation of weapon output versus the cost of maintenance
activities. Important parameters are examined in a cost minimiza-
tion formulation using a standard Lagrangean format. The analysis
is extended into subjective consideration of utility of reliability,
and risk and uncertainty. How the analysis could be used to assist
a weapon development agency in design and maintenance decisions
is indicated.
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I . BACKGROUND
A. Nature of the Problem
The problem to be investigated is how to provide most efficiently,
in an economic sense, a high probability of a weapon containing a
complex functional device to operate properly whenever, within its
prescribed service life, it is called upon to do so. We are speaking
of explosive weapons which are only called upon to operate once. The
time at which a weapon is used may be when almost new or after it has
undergone a long period of storage. "Long" in this case means long
enough that a predicted
. low failure rate under a relatively benign
storage condition becomes significant in reduction of reliability
at the time of use.
The intent of this thesis is to explore how the standard tools
of economic analysis may be applied to assist in a decision process
concerning provision of reliability which cannot properly be the
domain of reliability and systems engineering specialists alone.
Some of the important questions to be decided in arriving at a weapon
system of given effectiveness at least cost are:
Thus, already we see that the reliability definition above is
open to ambiguous interpretation, dependent on what has been the past
history of the weapon at the time of use. Contractors usually like
to be held to only meeting what is called an initial (when new) or
inherent reliability. Inherent has the broader connotation of meaning
what the design would be capable of producing if everything in the
production process were done perfectly. But then this reliability is
stated to pertain initially, and the prediction of degradation before
use (while it is in the hands of the using service, albeit under known
specified procedures and environmental conditions) is a complex question
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(1) Should the design and support concept be that of a "wooden
bomb"? By wooden bomb is meant a weapon for which neither test not
maintenance is necessary after its introduction into the operational
inventory of a military service. Under this concept, to meet a
reliability goal applicable after a long service life and given that
reliability does degrade with time, one must pay the extra cost of
development of a system with higher reliability when equipment is new.
But there are obvious counterbalancing savings from the absence of
test and maintenance expenses.
(2) If periodic tests are to be conducted, what are the nature
and frequency of the tests? The trade-off here is between the cost
of obtaining information and the value of the information obtained.
Decision rules are needed concerning action upon completion of test -
continue in use, repair, or replace.
(3) If the intended support concept is to treat the weapon like
a wooden bomb, should allowance be made in the design for a change in
the planned logistics sequence should the expectation of conditions
upon which the decision was based be proved wrong in such a way as
to impose a severe penalty for not having a test and maintenance
activity? The question here is analogous to whether or not to pay
an insurance premium for possible failures during the service life -
failures whose probability may be known much less exactly than events
based on insurance actuarial tables.
(4) What should be the reliability goal of the weapon, considering
the possibility of a repair/replace cycle or not? Although the problem
in reliability engineering, particularly from the standpoint of the
reliability when new, has been extensively treated by sophisticated

optimization techniques trading off attainment of high reliability
versus performance degradation and the costs of producing high
reliability equipment with attendant comprehensive test programs; the
solutions, especially in weapons for expensive strategic missile
systems, have been rather trivial and arbitrary from an economic
point of view. The worth of the weapon and supporting missile system
has been so high that the reliability goal for the functional device
in the weapon has been set very high, near the level of estimated
feasibility with little regard for cost. But costs are expended in
an attempt to meet the reliability specification, and in that way of
doing business there is not likely to be an attempt made to see that
marginal cost is equated to marginal revenue. A trend toward multiple
weapons on each missile should enhance the importance of the economic
costs of attaining reliability relative to weapon worth since the total
value of the system, although it may be somewhat larger, is spread over
many more weapons, reducing the value per weapon.
(5) Should the available design alternatives for the functional
device, based on acceptably proved technology, be deemed unsatisfactory,
suggesting that a different type of device be developed for the weapon?
Technological considerations may have dictated use of an electronic
device of considerable series complexity. Rather than expend effort in
raising the reliability of this design, a better alternate solution
might be to invest in a research and development program for a device
utilizing a different technical approach with a potential for higher
reliability at the same or lower cost to do the same job.

B. Failure Rate Prediction
Reliability of a device is usually conceptually considered
in two different ways, dependent on whether the device must operate
over a long period of time or is a one-time use piece of equipment.
For an explosive mechanism usually the latter applies and a prediction
of reliability would be based on the result of many trials of hopefully
identical mechanisms, with reliability estimated by the number of
successes divided by the total number of trials. For prediction of
reliability for devices which must operate for a finite length of
time in order to meet the definition of mission success, the reliability
may be predicted prior to experimental testing of the device if one
has a basis for predicting the probability distribution of failures
over time. An estimation of failure rate expressed mathematically
leads to a calculation of reliability based upon the estimate.
Prediction of the failure rate of a complex functional device is based
upon what is known or assumed about the failure rates of the parts
making up the device and how these parts are assembled together.
Electronic devices will be used for illustration in this thesis both
because of their practical importance and their amenability to mathe-
matical modeling and prediction of failure rates. However, it should
be remembered that the economic theory does not depend on the physical
nature of the device. It will also be evident that the decisions of
major economic importance are not dependent on very accurate predictions
of failure rate.
This thesis does not dwell on the engineering aspects of the
problem although they are of prime importance in any practical
application. Reliability prediction procedures for electronic equipment

have been extensively investigated. Reference 1 is cited for
a comprehensive treatment of electronic design and reliability
engineering; reference 2 for reliability engineering as related to
maintainability and system effectiveness. Data on failure rates
of electronic parts for predictions of equipment reliability on military
contracts are compiled in reference 3 . A consistent set of terms
and symbols will be used in this thesis, not necessarily consistent
with that used in any of the references cited.
The reliability of an electronic device is inversely proportional
to series complexity, but considerable complexity may be necessary to
obtain desired performance characteristics. Given the design concept,
a prediction can then be made of a reliability which might be attained
when the equipment is new. Usually in the past a prediction of failure
rate during dormant storage has been considered too difficult to be
done or deemed not significant. However, a recent report of a study
based on extensive data gathering sheds more light on storage effects
on electronic equipment and part reliability, indicating the feasibility
of meaningful quantitative prediction 4 . If this proves to be valid
and the dormant failure rates are significant, it is important that
weapon system planning take them into account.
Assuming a Poisson distribution of failures over time, the
reliability of a series system of electronic parts is expressed by
an exponential model:
R = e
Numbers in will refer to the list of literature cited at
the end of the thesis.

where
R = reliability of the system
e = base of natural logarithm
X = constant failure or hazard rate under a specified set of
conditions
t = time under the specified conditions.
For a weapon we will consider a factory-to-target sequence (FTS)
with time phases which have different associated failure rates,
dependent on the associated environmental or use conditions, and
whether the equipment is operating or non-operating. Thus, for each
time period of index i, we have




u . = basic failure rate under environmental conditions defined
as standard





consistent with a failure rate addition rule of independent events.
In this paper we will call the product for any period the hazard
product, defined as
h. = X .t. .
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Predicting the failure rate of a new configuration has been called
"a vague and imprecise process at best" 5 . But the author of the
remark shows the value in estimating the uncertainty involved, and
it follows that a meaningful estimate is better than no estimate at all

C. Measure of Effectiveness
To do an economic analysis of a weapon system we must decide
on a measure of effectiveness (MOE) , the output of the weapon's
production function. System effectiveness of a weapon system is
generally considered to be a product of the following three items:
(1) Reliability
(2) Performance characteristics, given no failure
(3) Availability or proportion of time ready for use.
To consider whether we are using the proper MOE in our analysis
we have to talk about suboptimization and proximate criteria. These
are discussed in Chapter 2 of reference 6 in relation to the
manufacturing industry. The same principles apply to our production
of reliability in a weapon. It is brought out that a manufacturing
department for practical reasons may have to optimize at its own
level although ideally the problems should be solved according to the
purpose of the over-all organization. The criterion a department
uses which is not explicitly linked to over-all objectives is labeled
a proximate criterion. The proximate criterion should be consistent
with a good criterion at a higher level. It is clear then that
reliability of a weapon is only a proximate criterion. In fact,
effectiveness of the weapon based on the three items above is not
an overall criterion if the weapon is only a part of the weapon
system. We must be careful when using a proximate criterion such
as reliability of a weapon to take account of the interaction of our
activities to increase reliability on the other elements of the MOE.
In this thesis which will primarily for illustrative purposes
consider the reliability of weapons in the context of a strategic
missile system, the use of the effectiveness of the weapon deployed

by the missile as a proximate criterion for the effectiveness of
the entire missile system seems reasonable in making decisions concerning
design of the carried weapon. The weapon containing a complex functional
device for causing its detonation at the proper time in the trajectory
will be called the re-entry body (REB) . Since the rest of the missile
system will in general involve more complex functions than the REB
(for example^ propulsion and guidance), we can in looking at sub-
optimization of the effectiveness of the REB disregard explicit use
of the availability term. That is, availability of the' REB will be
maintained at 100% of missile carrying capability, utilizing scheduled
down time of the missile to accomplish any planned maintenance of
the REB. (This does not say we should not worry about non-availability
of REB T s which might result from unexpected deficiencies in design
which are subsequently brought to light by some testing program.)
The extra REB's necessary to allow a planned level of maintenance which
might reduce their availability in the ordinary sense of the word
would appear in increased costs of procurement - not in reduction
of effectiveness.
The above treatment of availability might seem to be untrue for
tactical weapons as opposed to strategic ones, but in some cases
it would be quite similar. Although in theory resupply of weapons
can take place, a given battle is usually fought with what is on
hand. For example, if we consider a shipboard surface-to-air missile
(SAM) for fleet air defense, only a given number can be available
on board for any engagement. Effectiveness during any battle is
only reduced by the availability term if the maintenance concept
calls for testing the functional devices on board for a decision as

to their condition, with or without provision for repair on board if
condition is deemed bad. If the concept calls for issuance to the
fleet of a "wooden round" (completely assembled SAM with no further
tests called for) , availability on board will be 100% with effectiveness
reduced only if this concept results in lowered reliability.
The REB influences on performance to be considered are those
which affect explosive yield of the contained warhead and accuracy on
target. Anything which increases weight and volume of the functional
device detracts from yield, due to robbing space and weight allocation
for the warhead. It also detracts from accuracy because it restricts
design options for the REB.
D. Analogy with Economic Theory
Since the stated intent is to apply standard tools of economic
analysis to the problem, the analogy between a supply of reliability
and a more usual economic good will be pointed out here.
In building up a supply curve of reliability from cost curves
we can relate to the classic article by Viner 7 which treated
the supply curve of firms as dependent upon different types of
technological and pecuniary cost situations under the assumption of
atomistic competition. His stated purpose of presenting formal types
of relationships which could be conceived to exist under certain
simplifying assumptions to help answer the question - Which cost
curve is the proper supply curve? - is a valid objective here. Where
Viner speaks of a firm within an industry producing a product,
will consider the processes or activities within the entire set of
productive services which combine to supply units of weapon reliability
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(looked upon as an increase of weapon reliability, AR, above some
basic level because reliability must refer to some specific design)
.
Where Viner speaks of price of product, we will use the value of
unit AR. The items of interest will be the increasing portions of
the average and marginal cost curves and how they relate to price
of product. The practical nature of the pecuniary and technological
cost situations of improving reliability puts one immediately into an
area of increasing average costs, which is probably implicitly recognized
by the development agencies. But do they consider the much higher
marginal cost which should be examined for intersection with the
price level to determine the quantity of AR produced?
The average and marginal costs are of course derived from the
total cost function. The factors which lie behind the total cost
function in the theory of the firm in relation to production decisions
and the utilization of resources are discussed in Chapter 7 of
reference 8 . Starting with: (1) a production function which
relates outputs to inputs, (2) prices of product and inputs, and
(3) the assumption that profit is to be maximized subject to the
constraint of the production function; nine theorems are derived which
correspond to the rules of standard marginal economic analysis. In
our case the single output is AR of the weapon. The inputs are
the various activities for which the cost of each will be translated
into monetary terms. In this format the only resource to be allocated
is money. For optimal decisions one of the theorems proved is that
the marginal product per dollar cost is equal for every input. That
is, the marginal AR per dollar cost of each reliability improvement
process should be equal. Another theorem proved states that any
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output will be produced such that its selling price equals marginal cost.
This corresponds to the price (value) of unit AR determining the level
of AR so that marginal cost of AR does equal price. Similar analogy can
be made with the other theorems.
Two concepts from price theory, both discussed in Chapter 7 of
reference 9 should be introduced - opportunity costs and external dis-
economies. Opportunity cost for producing a given amount of product is
the amount of another product which could have been produced with the
given marginal amount of input. We will use the term to indicate the
amount of another performance aspect which would have been obtained if we
had not spent a given amount on AR. Viewed another way, consideration of
the costs involving the overall MOE versus the costs when considering
teliability alone corresponds to a social cost versus an individual
industry cost. We can put these costs in monetary terms if we can place
a value on the various performance aspects. Secondly, external diseconomies
may result from expansion of output overall. In production theory a
monetary diseconomy pertains if the price of inputs rise or a technological
diseconomy pertains if average costs rise for other reasons. In our case
the primary reason for an individual reliability effort to be more
expensive as the aggregate effort rises is the limited amount of AR possible
Even if not directly conflicting in their attainment of objectives, the
impact of the activities accentuates the importance of diminishing returns
as reliability to be gained approaches zero.
In the reliability improvement problem direct analogy with opportunity
costs and external diseconomies of standard production theory is somewhat
strained. The two concepts might more properly be lumped together and
called "external effects"; that is, activities to improve ' bility
have effects on other items of the ultimate MOE in addition to th
effects on each other. It is even conceivable that these effects could
be so large in a negative direction that the relation between
and weapon system effectiveness would not be a monotonically inc
i
function. In this thesis the costs from these external effects will be
called opportunity cost: . but it should be noted that there is not an
exact parallel to the opportunity costs of standard economic analysis.
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The processes or activities of the development agency to improve
weapon reliability, which relate to the productive services of a firm,
will be categorized as follows:
(1) Functional Design
(a) Reduction of complexity
(b) Redundancy
(c) Improvement of insensitivity to parameter changes
(d) Provisions for test in field
(2) Packaging
(a) Provisions for integrated test in manufacture
(b) Accessibility for test and repair/replace in field
(c) Environmental stress protection
(3) Manufacturing and Quality Control
(a) Use of high reliability parts
(b) Process control and testing of weapon
(4) Operational Procedures
(a) Test and repair/replace cycle
(b) Mitigation of stress factors
These activities are chosen to relate primarily to the expected reliability
of the weapon rather than to the confidence with which that reliability
is predicted although the two aspects are intimately related. For
instance, the activities under item (3) above involve quantities of
tests, many of which will be determined by statistical confidence limits
based on some assumption of probability distribution of attributes.
But the primary purpose of the activity is to increase expected
reliability in the ultimate use. We have not included operational
tests (OT) as a category - the OT being a near as full-scale test
as possible under as near actual use conditions as possible - the real
purpose not being to improve reliability of the weapon but to increase
confidence that the assumptions which led to the predicted reliability
were correct. That is, the OT does not just increase statistical
confidence in the ordinary sense although every sample contributes,
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but it gives qualitative confidence that the lower level test programs
were testing piece-meal the proper attributes to insure over-all
success in an operational mission. (The Operational Procedures test
category, 4a above, refers to a test or monitoring operation on the
functional device in the field with the explicit intent of discovering
and correcting bad devices before use.) Nor have we included a stock-
pile sampling program (SSP) which would make thorough, intensive
investigations (usually destructive tests) of small samples from the
operational inventory. The SSP also makes a small contribution to
the statistical confidence of reliability, but it primarily would
forewarn of an impending degradation of reliability. As such an SSP
has no effect on reliability unless further action is taken based upon
the information provided.
Now, having indicated that we will consider the activities
primarily in terms of expected reliabilities, we will find it necessary
to extend the analysis into a more subjective area in order to make
final common sense decisions. The two major categories, both widely
used in economic theory, are:
(1) Risk, Uncertainty and Profit
(2) The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk.
The first category is the title of the 1921 book by Knight analyzing
profit theory from largely a macroeconomic point of view, but Chapter
7 of which is pertinent here in its discussion of the meaning of
risk and uncertainty 10 . The second is the title of a 1948 article
by Friedman and Savage which describes utility functions of individuals
for the purpose of explaining behavior under the postulate of maximi-
zation of expected utility 11 . The pertinent portion therein is
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the shape of the utility function of one who will pay a premium to
avoid a large loss. We will turn the argument around; rather than
explaining behavior, we will indicate what the rational behavior of
the development agency should be (design decision alternatives) based
upon an assumption of at least the gross shape of the ultimate user's
utility function for the product. The above two references and many
others are cited in the 1965 study by Fellner of economic behavior
along Bayesian lines 12 j . We will use only a few of the ideas from
this large field of decision making under uncertainty in an attempt
to have our profit maximization make sense in accordance with utility
theory and in the presence of subjective probability.
Next let us define terms for use in this thesis (which as in
reliability theory cannot be consistent with all the references) and
indicate the relation to the particular subject. Risk applies where
the probability of an event can be calculated in terms of a standard
process (heads or tails type) even though the values assigned to the
standard process may be somewhat subjective. Basically, risk is
calculated by frequentist methods - observing an event many times
and relating probability to observed frequency. It seems logical
then to put failure rate prediction for electronic devices into the
risk category. Even though the particular device has not yet even
been built, the reliability calculations are based on piece part
experience with failure rates derived by frequency methods. Uncertainty,
on the other hand, applies where a method of calculation of probability
of an event is less clear - sometimes said to be a case of no theory
for calculation. But the subjectivist approach allows for appraisal
of probability values and using them to inject judgment of this nature
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in the decision process. We will use uncertainty to apply to the
appraisal of failure modes which would result in reliability values
beyond the scope of which the mathematical models will predict. For
example, developers of complex functional devices for weapons where
the specification for reliability is well above 90% will never show
a mathematical model for a meaningful prediction of the probability
of achieving only 20%. But we know that such things, verging on
catastrophic in terms of mission success for the weapon system, have
happened; and people with experience can be expected to make meaningful
appraisals of the likelihood of such happenings. If one recognizes
the appraisal of the probability of unpredicted failure modes, the
result may be a decision to select alternatives which entail real
and opportunity costs (buying insurance) to make it less costly to
correct unsuspected defects should they occur.
Essentially then we can list three levels of refinement in
maximizing the profit from reliability provision activities:
(1) Maximize value of expected reliability minus the cost of
providing it where we assume constant value of units of reliability.
(2) Maximize the expected utility (ex ante profit) of the




G = marginal utility of potential gain
L = marginal disutility of potential loss




ex ante profit = / (G - L) dX
where the potential gains and losses are calculated using the risk
probabilities. This calculation will not be done because the utility
function is not known but qualitative judgments can be made from
postulation of its general shape.




II. PROVISION OF INITIAL RELIABILITY
A. Subsystem Reliability Allocation
To begin taking one step at a time in attacking a very complex
problem let us first consider how we might arrive at a reliability
goal for the REB, one subsystem of the missile, abstracting from any
consideration of degradation with age. That is, we consider failure
rate as zero during any period of the FTS except time in missile flight.
This facet of the problem will be considered in Chapter III.
For a weapon system made up of several subsystems the general
problem is that of allocating reliabilities to the subsystems so that
overall reliability is attained at minimum cost. In terms of production
theory the output, system reliability, is a function of the inputs,
the reliabilities of the various subsystems, with each of the latter having
a given cost function. The problem is very non-linear and complex.
The design options are not only non-linear with cost but are usually
non -continuous functions. The various alternatives involve quantum
jumps. There are also interdependencies among the subsystems in the
production function. Also, the costs to be properly taken into
account are not pecuniary costs alone but opportunity costs as defined
in Section ID because the design options will often affect other
parameters than reliability in the systems effectiveness relationship.
This is another way of saying reliability is not the ultimate MOE.
However, these complexities notwithstanding, the allocation could in
principle be solved for an optimal decision of obtaining given system




reliabilities we would expect the marginal product per dollar to be
equal for every input - that is, the marginal unit of reliability to
cost the same in every subsystem.
In practice the reliability goals may not be set in this manner
and possibly with good reason, considering all the uncertainties in
any calculation. However, conducting the cost estimating exercise
may give some valuable insights into parameter sensitivities and be
of great assistance in making good judgments on alternatives, even
though little faith is put in exact attainment of the calculated
values. There may also be good reason to make decisions about the
re-entry subsystem design independently of the other subsystems -
except for using the cost of the over-aU missile system as a measure
for pricing the product, the reliability provided within the REB
subsystem. On technical grounds the REB is from a functional view-
point relatively independent of the rest of the missile functions.
Most of the fallibility occurs in a device which operates during
time when the REB has been separated from the missile. Also, techno-
logical advances or reaction to enemy defenses may dictate putting
new re-entry systems on the same missile. Lastly, there are
institutional impediments to close engineering optimization in the
development of the re-entry body with the rest of the missile because
the warhead portion of the REB is provided by the Atomic Energy
Commission, a co-partner with the Department of Defense in REB design
changes. Negotiating interface changes with an autonomous partner
can be a lengthy process. This impediment may seem unreasonable
but it is real.
Due to the high cost of a strategic missile system for delivery
of the weapons, it soon becomes apparent that the reliability provided
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in the REB should be relatively high, well into the area of decreasing
marginal returns of reliability gained from improvement activities.
There is then a temptation to merely estimate what might be technically
feasible without regard to cost and set this as the reliability goal.
This could be the proper goal, but it might be too high. It might be
cheaper to buy more missiles rather than trying to push REB reliability
into a very high marginal cost region.
Consider the MOE for the next higher level criterion to be the
capability of inflicting damage on a given target complex. The number
of REB's required is a decreasing function of their reliability while
the cost of the REB's is an increasing function of their reliability.
For reasons cited above the over-all problem of minimizing the total
cost of a system to do a given amount of damage will not be worked
directly including the REB as one of the subsystems, but the marginal
cost curve of units of REB reliability will be generated from various
reliability levels. This curve is the supply curve of reliability
and is useful in finding an optimal level of reliability if we can
provide the proper marginal value of REB reliability consistent with
the ultimate MOE.
If one assigned a constant price or value for one unit of
reliability percentage
,
this price would be proportional to the fractional
2
cost " of the missile system required to place one weapon on target
This assumes that the price of product is constant no matter what
quantity of product is supplied, or, in other words, that all units of
AR are of equal value to the customer.
o
By fractional cost we mean the total cost of the missile system
divided by the number of weapons that system will deploy. We wish to
reserve the term average cost for total cost of reliability improvement
effort per weapon divided by units of reliability improvement attained.
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divided by 100%. For this purpose what is meant by cost of the missile
system? It is certainly more than the initial investment cost of
missiles and also more than the investment cost of missiles and the
remainder of the system, such as the launch platform and maintenance
facilities. The most suitable cost would seem to be the present value,
referred to the start of some planning period, with all investment and
operational costs of the entire missile system included over the expected
life cycle and discounted at an appropriate interest rate. Less than
100% reliability can result in a weapon's failure to function any time
during its life cycle. This manner of using present value to relate
to price of product implicitly assumes constant probability of use in
anger throughout the life cycle. This assumption may not be easily
defended but is no less reasonable than any alternative assumption in
this regard. The cardinal value is not too significant in the analysis
for the following reasons. We will be comparing the price of product
to the cost of reliability percentage at the margin. It seems logical
that the reliability units at the margin will not be as valuable to
the consumer as the reliability units in the lower range of reliability.
First consider this matter if the mission were deterrence. Certainly
anything above zero reliability is of some value and its unit value
may increase as reliability improves to a significant level of capability
Eventually we expect marginal value to decrease, and the level needed
for any given confidence of deterrence becomes very fuzzy. Next, if
Of course, all that is really needed for deterrence is the enemy's
belief in the destructive capability of the system. It has been said
that if the missiles were not ready on time, the first POLARIS sub-
marine should have gone to sea with telephone poles in the missile
tubes. But in our society it would be difficult to convince the enemy
we had an effective weapon system if we did not believe it ourselves.
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the MOE were capability of destruction of given portions of the value
of a target complex, in most targeting schemes we would still have
diminishing returns as the number of weapons on target increases.
The price of product based directly upon the fractional cost of the
missile system may thus be looked upon as an upper bound of the value
of the product as implicitly determined by the decisions of some higher
levels of authority in making an investment in the system.
Tms manner ot prorating costs to each weapon in the case of a
tactical missile system would result in estimates of price of product
of considerably lower order of magnitude than for a strategic missile.
This would not be due alone, or possibly not even primarily, to the
lower cost of the tactical missile. A major difference is that many
missiles may be used in each launch facility; that is, there is a
capability to reload in the tactical systems while the strategic systems
are only supported for a one-shot war. If many reloads are expected,
the cost of the entire system is divided by a large number in prorating
cost to each weapon. A common practice in cost effectiveness studies
of assuming the military worth of a weapon equal to the cost of the
weapon alone then is not too bad in this event. On the other hand,
the costs of some of the activities to improve reliability for the
tactical weapons may not be that far removed from similar costs on
the strategic weapons, particularly in the category of direct costs
as opposed to opportunity costs. Thus, we might expect some
This conclusion follows because the expectation of weapons which
will detonate on target is a direct multiplicative factor of expected
reliability. The value of product ( A R) then, if calculated by pro
rata costs of the entire system and treated as constant throughout
the range of AR provided, would be too high at the margin of reliability





dramatically different conclusions on how far to pursue reliability
improvement in the different systems.
B. Generalized Lagrange Optimization Problem
If we consider several different activities to improve reliability
the efficient combination of those activities is a constrained optimi-
zation problem:
Maximize X where X = AR, the increase in reliability above some
baseline design value; subject to Vc. = C where C. is the total
cost of each activity, and the summation is over all activities.
Where the X under consideration is a small range of potential
reliability improvement and the number of activities each with small
individual payoff is limited, it may be reasonable to consider
X = /,X. where X. is the AR from each activity, in spite of the
interdependencies which exist over large ranges and being careful
to throw out non-feasible solutions where the level of some activities
might make the assumed cost versus payoff of other activities incorrect
The relation between each X. and its corresponding C. would be
expected to be a set of numbers corresponding to different design
options or program plans. The X. is the expected reliability
improvement from that activity level and C. the expected cost, either
pecuniary or opportunity. Instead of having only a monetary cost
constraint, one could conceive of several other constraints, such
as allowable accuracy degradation or weight allocation. Indeed,
in the usual way of doing business these type of constraints are
likely to be dictated to the development activity. But if the valid
MOE is kill potential on target, assignment of an accuracy requirement,
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for example, by higher authority implies that the suboptimization
problem for weapon development activities has been solved. It
appears more logical to translate all the constraints into pecuniary
or opportunity costs in monetary terms and then look for the efficient
solution for use of development activities.
Thus to solve the suboptimization problem of where to put the
reliability improvement effort we have a problem with the following
characteristics: Maximize a payoff function, reliability improve-
ment X, made up of the sum of several semi-independent activities
each producing an X . at a cost C, with an over-all constraint of
/ ^C . = C. Since we are not putting great faith in a particular
quantitative value of an optimum solution, we want a technique which
gives considerable insight into the qualitative nature of the parameters
without unduly extensive computation. The technique suggested is
that of the Generalized Lagrange Multiplier Method described in
reference 13 for solving problems of optimum allocation of resources,
which can be applied similarly here for optimum allocation of relia-
bility improvement activities, each utilizing the one monetary




where m is the Lagrange multiplier for the over-all problem. We do this
for a range of m values . Then a set of X. and C. which is feasible
A more complete explanation of application of the Generalized
Lagrange Multiplier Method to this problem is given in Appendix 1.
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represents optimal solutions to the overall problem
Maximize: X =/ ^X .
Subject to^C. = C
1
A plot of C versus X for various m values will build up a total cost
curve from which we can derive average and marginal cost cruves. As
in the ordinary Lagrangean formulation, the m corresponding to any
dX 1
solution point is
-r^ or — equals the marginal cost of the
reliability improvement.
It should be emphasized that when speaking of average and
marginal costs the quantity of product referred to is units of
reliability (or units of hazard product as defined in section IB).
In normalizing these costs to be applicable to one weapon, of course,
some calculations are carried out in the usual sense of a fixed cost
for a certain development activity and unit cost per weapon for the
same activity. Thus our C. (a total cost in terms of product X.)
when a pecuniary cost is actually a sum of (1) a per weapon cost and
(2) the quotient of a fixed cost divided by the number of weapons
proposed for total production. It is clear that opportunity costs
as used here must be calculated so as to be applicable to one weapon
deployment capability in the fleet in order that they may be added
directly to the normalized pecuniary costs (neglecting a small amount
of spares which would bring production totals above deployment
capability)
.
Consider a hypothetical program where the weapon is an REB for
a strategic missile. The warhead in the REB will be caused to
detonate at a prescribed height above target by an electronic arming
and fuzing device (AFD) in the REB. We will assume that all the
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fallibility (reliability reduction) comes from the AFD. Let us assume
we want to decide upon design alternatives in four activity areas
of reliability improvement to a basic design which presently exists
with an expected initial reliability of R resulting therefrom.
Expected reliability improvement and cost estimates for different
levels of intensity are needed for each activity in order to tabulate
the reliability improvement (X.) versus cost (C.) relationships for
use in a generalized Lagrangean calculation. The activities chosen
and an approach for generating the X. versus C. relationships are
described in Appendix 2.
C. Generalized Lagrangean Calculation
To illustrate use of the generalized Lagrangean we will assign
some numbers to our hypothetical missile development program.
Assume a missile system whose projected present value of cost
exclusive of provision of the REB's at the beginning of a ten-year
planning period is 20 billion dollars. The system has launch facilities
for 500 missiles, which pro rates 40 million dollars per missile,
neglecting consideration of spares. If each missile carries ten
REB's, this fro rates four million dollars per REB, and assuming
one million dollars for the cost of the basic REB, we assign a value to
deployment of each REB of five million dollars. Calling this the
worth of close to 100% reliability, we assign a price of AR as 50
thousand dollars per one percent of AR.
Assume the basic REB design has an expected reliability of 90%
and the (X. = AR) versus C. relationships obtainable for activities
i = 1 to 4 are estimated to be that shown in Table I. The activity
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numbers refer to those described in Appendix 2. We will keep in
3
mind an additional constraint that a solution which shows Y] X . > 6
i =1
x
is not feasible, the reason being that activity #4 could not produce
reliability improvements at costs given due to decreasing marginal
returns if this high an aggregate intensity level for the first three
were used.













i = activity index number
X. = reliability improvement
C. = cost of reliability improvement
TABLE I. RELIABILITY IMPROVEMENT VERSUS COST
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Next we use various values of m and compute X. - mC Results
are shown in Table II. The asterisk values in the table trace out
the unconstrained maximizations for each activity level. The X. and
C. corresponding to these values are added to give the total X and
C for each value of m . Average and marginal costs are then calculated
as shown and plotted in Figure 1.
Note the plot shows that if we continue to price the product at
50K$ and use marginal cost, we will choose a program with an expected
reliability of 96 or 97 percent. However, if average costs are used,
which may be done in effect even though a conscious attempt at pricing
the product is not done, the cost curves indicate one should push
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FIGURE 1 AVERAGE AND MARGINAL COST FOR RELIABILITY IMPROVEMENT

III. MAINTENANCE OF RELIABILITY
A. Reliability Model
In this chapter we will consider the problem of selecting an
optimum design alternative, taking into account the degradation during
dormant conditions. We will be looking for a minimum cost solution to
obtain a given effectiveness level as a function of (1) the initial
reliability and (2) the planned frequency of periodic tests to find
and correct failures rates which occur during dormancy.
For an example of how dormant failure rates might be important,
we will consider a simplified FTS for the REB of a hypothetical ballistic
missile shown in Figure 2. There is an electronic AFD of given series
complexity in the REB. The AFD is dormant until it rides a missile
after aging for time t. It is activated after time t of missile flight
and must operate for time t during re-entry before sensing the target
and detonating the warhead. The expected hazard products during each
phase are shown at the top of each box. Assume failure rates and times
shown below:









t = 10 years (8.76-10 hours)
t
2
= 2 minutes (3.34-10 hours)
_2
t„ = 1 minute (1.67-10 ' hours)
Then, the expected hazard products and corresponding reliabilities
—
9 9 "3 ^




drops from 98.1% to 17.1% at the time of firing. If A were a factor
of 10 lower, the resultant reliability would be 82.5% or a reduction
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= failure rate in failures per hour






TABLE III. HAZARD PRODUCTS AND RELIABILITIES
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If a constraint were imposed that reliability must not be below
90% (R>R* = .9) during a service life of ten years, under the wooden
bomb philosophy the constraint would be violated. A no-test solution
would be complete replacement of AFD's corresponding to their age when
reliability drops to the constraining level. This is likely to be a
very high cost solution. Another approach involving no tests might
be feasible in a case where R of the basic design and R* are lower,
allowing room for improvement in reliability of the basic design to
increase the gap between R and R* enough to allow for degradation with
age. In addition to monetary costs of a higher reliability design
we would have degradation in the performance portion of the MOE due
to the larger weight and volume of the AFD. This solution may in
many cases be technically impossible because of the limited size of




To consider how often periodic testing might be economically
efficient to cull out failures, one must first determine whether or
not reliability improvement is even feasible from a test and maintenance
cycle. This has been analyzed for missile reliability, not considering
degradation with age but from the viewpoint of raising the reliability
of a lot of missiles by test and maintenance 14 . The model has the
following parameters
:
a = probability of a reliable missile being rejected
by test (producer's risk)
3 = probability of an unreliable missile being accepted
by test (consumer's risk)




P_ = probability that a missile will be repaired
during maintenance cycle
Equations are derived for the new reliability of a lot for given







the author found that for initial reliability of a lot greater than .892
the result of test and maintenance is a worsening of the reliability of
A R
the lot tested. He then defines efficiency as and effective
R
o
maintenance cost as maintenance cost divided by efficiency, and shows
that effective maintenance cost doubles in the region of R
n
from 80 to
85%, and of course becomes infinite near 89% for the above parameter
values
.
Let us assume that for our REB maintenance cycle we have condensed
these parameters into a factor, "a", which is the fraction of failures
discovered and corrected, assuming negligible degradation during test.




= 9^ years (dormant time before test)
t(. = \ year, (dormant time after test)
we get the results shown in Table IV for the two X values considered
earlier. The reliability after ten years without testing compared
If not assuming negligible degradation during test we could still
define an "a" such that (1 - a) times the original number of failures

























FIGURE 3. FTS WITH TEST AND REPAIR/REPLACE LOOP
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£ x -t. .272 .762 .0437 .957
dormant failure rate (failures per hour)
fraction of failures corrected in maintenance
cycle
(1 - a) \ t 4 hazard product after dormant time t . and
maintenance cycle








hazard product during boost
hazard product during re-entry
-xiti
TABLE IV. RESULTS OF MAINTENANCE CYCLE
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to the case with testing for the two dormant failure rates is:
17.1% raised to 76.2%
82.5% raised to 95.7%.
B. Problem Analysis for Absolute Minimum Reliability Requirement
For simplification of cost analysis let us condense the FTS even
more and assume that all failures occur during dormancy time before
missile flight and operating time during re-entry.
Then, at time t the hazard product
\ - Vi
and after test and repair/replace the hazard product
For periods of equal length t between testing, after n periods:
h
nt
- (l-a) n_1 + (l-a) n_2 + ....(1-a) + ll X^
h'
nt
= (l-a) n + (l-a) n_1 + ....(l-a)l X^
These two expressions are derived as follows. After each period
of length t
,
X t is added to the hazard product. After each maintenance
cycle the resultant hazard product is obtained by multiplying by (1 - a).
For example, for n = 2:
X'S + Vl ( 1 " a)Vl + Xih (1 - a) + ll X1t 1
ti
=[d -a) 2 + (1 -a)]h '2
tl
= d - a) h 2ti
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= e" ° where h =\ t is called
the initial hazard product, the total hazard product h versus time
over a service life of length T = nt would look like Figure 4.
Let us examine a solution for the case where higher authority
prescribes an absolute minimum reliability level as a requirement.
This may not be the most logical way to consider the allocation of
reliability effort, but it may often be the actual conditions under
which it must be done. For many institutional and administrative
reasons what should be treated as a first approach reliability goal
may become a firm requirement. This would imply that the higher
authority knows in absolute terms the maximum effectiveness necessary
to achieve a certain result - such as a given kill capability to assure
deterrence
.
Suppose a constraint is set that each REB never have a total hazard
product greater than h* (R > e" ). Let us assume that the REB has
a basic h which will not meet the constraint as a wooden bomb throughout
its service life, but improvement in initial reliability is possible,
and correction of dormant failures through test and maintenance is






























+ (2 - a)Xlt
V\ (1 - a)X t11
nt.
FIGURE 4. HAZARD PRODUCT VERSUS TIME
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(1) C(hn ) = the cost of obtaining a given initial reliability
as computed by the generalized Lagrangean technique
(2) Cost of testing, C T , where
C = cost of a test (monitoring) operation
T = prescribed service life
(3) Expected cost of repair or replacement for failures
detected, C -(a XT), where
' r 1
C = average cost of a repair operation.





We also assume "a" and X are not functions of h 2
To be plausible for C , this assumes ability to repair the AFD.
C would be a strong function of h
n
if replacement were made. But
even complete replacement might be much smaller than C(h
n
) which is
dominated by opportunity costs. If the AFD could not be replaced so
that C was on the order of a complete REB cost, then the term probably
becomes of more significance relative to C(h„)
.
2
The assumption would be totally unrealistic for X if the "basic"
reliability were of low order. For then the measures taken to improve
h
n
in the area of manufacturing and quality control would be assumed to
reduce dormant failures, which are due largely to built-in defects.
However, on the assumption th^t some of these built-in defects cannot
be detected by testing, the improved screening process will not discover
them, and it is likely that the process cannot be improved to eliminate
a detect whose nature is not known. In some regime of high initial
reliability, \ may be almost independent of h . If we assumed that u-^
would remain approximately a constant proportion of u~, which is indicated
by statistical results in some reliability regimes, we could represent
\ as a constant times h . The following analysis could be carried out
on this basis, but the results would be much more complex to analyze.
Note also that C would be expected to be a decreasing function of hQ
while x would increase with h . Thus the changes due to hQ would tend
to cancel each other.
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+ (2 - a) • X t^h'
Note that for a given h the constraint equation determines t
because the largest t possible will minimize cost for the given
h . That is, the equality will hold in the constraint equation at
an optimal solution. We can thus compute total costs for each of the
h values corresponding to design alternatives for which C(h
n
) values
were computed by the generalized Lagrangean. Results of such a computa
tion are shown in Table V for the following parameters:





X = 2.10 per hour
C = unassigned because the fixed cost does not affect
the optimization
h* = .10 and .06 (R* = 90% and 94% respectively)







Note that for R* = 90% no minimum cost is found in the regime of
design alternatives considered although the values seem to be quickly
approaching a minimum near the lowest value of R„ equal 94%. In this
case we might guess that there is something inconsistent in the value
judgments which resulted in spending the total amounts indicated for
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99 .01 360 4.10 21.4 381
98 .02 260 3.64 24.1 284
97 .03 185 3.17 27.6 213
96 .04 135 2.72 32.2 167
95 .05 95 2.27 38.6 133
94 .06 65 1.82 98.2 113 -•—
h* = .06 (R* = 94%)
99 2.27 38.6 399
98 1.82 48.2 30 8














nR = initial reliability = e
t = period between tests
C(h ) = cost of initial reliability
C T
—-
— = cost of testing
1
C T
VC = variable cost = C(hQ ) + —
=
—
TABLE V. TABULATION TO FIND MINIMUM VARIABLE COST AS A
FUNCTION OF hQ AND t
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the total program but would then set R* as low as 90%. For R* = 94%
the minimum cost is found at R„ = 96%. In summary, the solutions are:




t (hours) <1.82'10 3 .910- 10 3
n >48 96
Of course, if we examine the technical and operational constraints,
an indicated optimum solution may not be feasible.
Next let us pose the cost minimization problem for solution by use
of a Lagrangean with the constraint expressed as an equality. As will
be indicated, it is not particularly useful in this case as a method of
finding the optimal solution but, as pointed out by Samuelson in
reference 15 , it is often possible by using this framework to
determine the qualitative behavior of solution values in respect to
change of parameters
.
For example, the solution for the R* = 94% case calls for a
monitoring operation approximately every 5^ weeks. The C assigned,
if based only on the pecuniary cost of the monitoring operation, assumes
the REB would be available for test anyway, presumably to coincide with
down time on some other part of the weapon system. If this were not
the case and C had to cover weapon unavailability costs, C would be
much larger ana more dominating in the solution. Also, we are assuming
the number of tests over a service life is not large enough to cause the
failure rate of any of the components to move into the wearout region.
This is a function of the nature of the monitoring operation. We could
reduce the thoroughness of the test to avoid wearout but would also
inevitably reduce "a", the fraction of failures corrected which depends
on the number detected. So in the end, if none of the solutions look
feasible, we reconsider the basic design (perhaps allowing more for the



















First order conditions for an extremum:
ac T ac
ac r




ac T ac r
dt. at.
(2 - a) X
i





- h - (2 - a) X t + h* =
1 dc
It follows that m : T which is the marginal imputed cost
"HT77
of the constraint
"This is shown by taking total derivative of C and the constraint,
and using first order conditions
dCm = T dh + ^
CT dt





















To solve for h and t , note that by using the last equation
we can express t., as a function of h~ . Then if we could express ^r-
^ 1 dh„
as a function of h , we could write the second equation with h„
as the only unknown and solve for h . However, even if dC were
linear in h„ (which in general it is not) , we would have a third degree
equation to solve for h„ . In our discontinuous example, d C is
approximated by straight lines, but, to take advantage of this, one
would have to guess which segment would contain the solution point, and,
if the solution is near a change in slope, the answer might be erroneous
Thus, the iterative tabular method seems the more practical for getting
an indication of the approximate optimum solution in this case, but
it depends on the form of the cost information.
Taking the total differential of the first order conditions gives
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This is of form Ay = b where
A is the bordered Hessian (the Hessian above and to left of dotted
line) which must be positive definite for a minimum, a condition which
32 1
is satisfied if C is positive
,





as depicted in Figure 5, which is plotted from the information
in Table II.
Forming y= A " b
allows the qualitative examination of relations between parameters.
For example, if dT = dX = da = dh* = 0,
dt
l T
- • d „ where
m t
_i
refers to the second diagonal element of A " which is known to be
22
positive. This shows how the period between tests increases with the
cost of tests.
To illustrate further use of the second order conditions , let us
put in the values for our solution for the h* = .06 case. The values
are summarized below:
The sign of the determinant must be negative because there is one
constraint. Expanding by the first column gives
T
2
d CT / 9 ?\~ >("m/ ,o ^2 2V 2CmT e
on \ / t,
1
2
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h = 910 hours
n = 96
Parameters




C„ = 135 + 96 + 1.58 CT r







































We can then find
dc
-dh"
377 and deduce that t will increase with
ui
C but proportionally less rapidly by about 1/3 from the equilibrium
position.
Since dormant failure rate may be a parameter with very large
proportional uncertainty, let us examine the effect of its change with






l = 2.54 • 10
a m
- 4.42 • 10
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Suppose A X = 10 , corresponding to a 50% increase in failure rate.
Then,
Ah = - .004
At = - 254 hours
A m = - 442 K$ per unit h (greater in absolute value)
.
The h and m solution values have a smaller proportional change
(about 1/10) than t,
,
which must be decreased by about \. This could
be an encouraging result if t could be changed easily during the
operational life to take care of an unexpected dormant failure rate.
But it may not be the case and indeed, in this example, it was indicated
likely that the optimal solution initially called for would probably not
be feasible because of t being too short.
These results suggest that it may be most practical in many
systems to work the problem sequentially - first, finding an efficient
solution for initial reliability allowing for the possibility of
unfavorable results in the dormant failure rate area; later maximizing
the return over time, delaying the details of the monitoring program
as long as possible in order to utilize the best predictive information
that can be gleaned from the program before making the decision on the
nature of the monitoring program.
C. Problem Analysis for Average Reliability Over Time
What is proposed as a more logical approach than the minimum
reliability requirement of the previous section is to investigate
what average reliability level over time can be attained. This seems
better for several reasons. First, the likelihood of use is a completely
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random event for which average values over time are appropriate if the
swings above and below the average are not too large. It appears that
our answers tend to point toward a fairly larger number of test cycles
which will keep the variance small. Secondly, the variations in relia-
bility plotted over time are for a single weapon. In a practical
case the condition of different groups of weapons in the fleet being
in different parts of the cycle will cause a smoothing out of the
average reliability over time when looking at the fleet as a whole.
And it is this average as a whole which determines the effectiveness
of the entire weapon system.
Another way of looking at the objective is to consider that the
goal is to maximize the proportion of time which the weapon is good
(no dormant failures before firing) . This viewpoint allows closer
analogy to investigation on inspection programs for randomly failing
equipment in systems which are not one-time use but operate more or
less continually. For example, the paper by Weiss 16 which refers
to some of the many earlier papers on the subject says that the
objective of any checkout program is to minimize the down time due to
system failure (or maximize the expected operational readiness of the
system); and that when the reliability function is negative exponential,
the optimal checkout policy must be a periodic one. It is not considered
important here to rigorously show that the optimal inspection program
is periodic because practical considerations would undoubtedly dictate
Of course, much of this argument is valid for using the minimum
reliability requirement also, but the concept of adjusting effectivenes:
levels dependent on the cost of attainment seems more palatable when
we get away from the rigid specification of a minimum requirement. Also
the minimum level framework may tend to give answers which pay too much




its use, the advantage of simplicity in scheduling the checkouts
outweighing any sit all theoretical advantage of a more complex program.
Again considering the problem in terms of hazard product and
looking back to Figure 4, we see that without testing over the service
life T, the expectation of hazard product,
h + (h + X T) X-.T
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Then the improvement (decrease) in h is represented by
x l




If we can assign a value P to a unit of decrease in h, then the
"revenue" from the testing program is
^P X (T - 2bt
1
).
As before, for a given h , we can represent the cost of the testing
program as p „






We could then find t to maximize "profit" expressed as revenue minus

























verifies positive root corresponds to a maximum profit. For example,
using the same parameter values as in previous section for the h = .04
design, noting that b = .6 corresponds to a = .9, and assigning
3
P = 5 • 10 K$, our upper limit of the value of unit h, corresponding
to 50 K$ per 1% of AR, results in
t =1.21 ' 10 3 hours and
n = 72.5
or an inspection about once every 6.6 weeks.
For \ =2 • 10" ' per hour, the solution would be




or about once every five months. Thus, reducing the estimate of dormant
failure rate by a factor of ten still leaves a solution which calls
for considerable inspection.
For an analysis of the parameters consider the problem in
Lagrangean format, leaving out an assigned value of unit hazard product
(P) . The problem is to minimize
C T






h + bxltl = h
Note that once all parameters are assigned the constraint equation
determines t which then determines the cost so this is really not an
extremum problem at all. However, using the Lagrangean format as in
the previous section allows some insight into the nature of the
solution with qualitative change of parameters.
The Lagrangean: C = C -m h + bX t - h
First order conditions
:






- bX t + h =
ax
L
Of course, the maximum solution could be at a point of negative
profit if the "fixed cost" term containing C were high enough. But
this term is not expected to be dominating even if C involved complete





















Taking total differential of the first order conditions and multiplying


















.2 m * 1 1\ ^7
bt dX +X t db + dh - dh
To compare this approach with the (h , t ) optimization case of
previous section where we set h* = .06 and found
hQ
= .04
t = 910 hours,
our constraint equation indicates that we would set
h = .0532
and M = -
3
83 • 10 K$
This m value is larger in absolute value than the value of product
assigned (P) in our profit maximization calculation so the smaller
frequency of checking in that calculation is consistent.
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With these parameter values and for changes in X only
at
7
— = - 4.55 • 10
d\
^—— =
- 4.38 • 10
ax
1
Then if ax = 10
At = 455 hours
~ 3 AAm = - 4.38 • 10 K$ per unit h (greater in absolute value)
Compared to the (h
,
t ) optimization case, the change in X
has a much greater effect on the solution values, -455 compared to
-254 hours for t and -4380 compared to -422 K$ per unit h for Am.
Similarly for changes in b only,
dt,
— = - 90 8
6 b
d n 4^— =
- 2.63 ' 10
a b
If Ab = .1, corresponding to A a = -.1 (or b = . 7 and a = .8)





The cost in the testing area per unit h is seen to change more
rapidly than total costs
. The combination solution for h„ and
t tended to mask the importance of high "a" in keeping down
costs .
The interdependency between some of the parameters is also
well illustrated graphically. Looking at Mas a function of
3
C and for the parameters chosen, m= 8.83 • 10 C is plotted as
m m v
the middle line in Figure 6. Choosing h so as to reduce (h - h )
by half results in the lower line and doubling (h - h ) yields the
upper line. One could compare the intersection of the chosen
line with the value of C against his idea of the value of the
m
product, one unit of h reduction. Starting with the upper line,
one would want to reduce h until the indicated m or marginal cost
equaled the value of the product. One can also see in this figure
that, dependent on the choice of (h - h
n )
, marginal cost may or
may not be very sensitive to C . For (h - h ) very small (little
degradation in reliability allowed) marginal cost is very sensitive
to C .
m
This type of analysis could of course be extended to investi-
gate the sensitivity of other parameters in a similar manner.
Those parameters whose values are not well known and to which the
solution is sensitive then provide valid warning against too much
confidence in the indicated design solution.
Thus far we have indicated a method of economic analysis
to maximize the value of expected reliability minus the cost
of providing it. We will next look further at modifications based












h - h = .0066
FIGURE 6. MARGINAL COST VERSUS COST OF MONITORING

IV. UNCERTAINTY CONSIDERATIONS
In this chapter we will consider in a qualitative way
those activities of reliability improvement which were not a factor
in any of the previous calculations. As indicated in Section ID
the dividing line between risk based on objective probabilities
and uncertainty evaluated by subjective judgment and probabilities
is not clearcut. A descriptive activity might be categorized
one way or the other, dependent on how much back-up data is
available.
As one group of activities let us consider the reliability
improvement processes we had numbered (lc), (2c), and (4b);
namely,
(lc) Functional Design - Improvement of insensitivity to
parameter changes
(2c) Packaging - Environmental stress protection
(4b) Operational Procedures - Mitigation of stress factors
These three activities, most particularly the last two, involve
what stress factor, k, is to be assigned to the various phases of
the FTS . The value of k in any event is one of the least well
known factors in our calculations because the statistical accuracy
of much of the data is based on experiments on components under
standard conditions. How this data will apply to conditions on
a yet-to-be-built weapon system is highly subjective. The
insensitivity to parameter changes is more directly related to




Again the piece part data is more clearly applied in the area of
catastrophic failures of parts because the characteristics of
the design of each device will determine whether a given change
of parameters in a part will actually cause a failure of the
device due to tolerance limits being exceeded. Another factor
complicating calculation is the consideration of an environment
caused by enemy countermeasures in which a device may have to
operate. For example, the radiation environment from enemy
defensive nuclear weapons will change the tolerance levels which
determine whether an electronic device will still operate properly
or not. Determination of this level is difficult enough in a
benign environment. If one tries to design to be fairly immune
to tolerance failures in a specific radiation environment (high
environmental levels because that seems to be a "conservative"
approach), but one which is deemed unlikely to be encountered,
the result appears to be a cost for the activity with little
calculable gain in reliability.
If these are not clearly areas of uncertainty, then they
at least seem to be activities in which the risks can be slanted,
dependent on a particular evaluation of failure probabilities.
Slanting is used in the manner of Fellner in 12 where the
mathematical expectation of values is consistently adjusted to
influence the quantity of product in one way or the other. Consider
Figure 7. As indicated before in our calculation of an initial
reliability goal using a constant value of product, P, the inter-







FIGURE 7. LEVELS OF OUTPUT
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the left of the intersection with average cost (AC) . Now if one
maximized utility where the marginal utility of product was
diminishing, the indicated level of reliability would be further to
the left as illustrated by a marginal utility surplus (MUS) curve
crossing the abscissa. This would be the same as saying that P
decreased with reliability in the manner of curve P' to intersect
the MC curve as shown. This is analogous to our previous contention
that the assumption of constant price of product puts an upper
bound on the reliability goal which one should set. Of course, it
could happen that a decision maker assumed constant price and found
the intersection with average cost, but slanted all his expectations
in such a manner to select the reliability level indicated by
correct use of MUS. But that would be happenstance, and he might
slant to make matters worse.
Next consider activities (Id), (2b), and (4a):
(Id) Functional Design - Provisions for test in field
(2b) Packaging - Accessibility for test and repair/replace
in field
(4a) Operational Procedures - Test and repair/replace cycle
These three activities are all closely interdependent and related
to dormant failure rates or failures induced by the testing itself.
In functional design, the circuits must be provided so that
information can be gained by monitoring as to whether the equipment
is good or bad. The surest way is to essentially cause the
equipment to operate, but this would usually involve a severe
design penalty to preclude significant degradation from the test
itself. A visual test would not degrade the device but neither
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would it give much information. Thus, the test procedure selected
will not give perfect information, and there will likely be some
degradation from the test itself. Also one must have a general
idea as to how many monitoring operations will be conducted in
the service life of the weapon in order to select compatible
components. The manner of packaging the functional device within
the weapon affects the same factors and together the two activities
largely determine what the "a" factor for a monitoring operation
will be. The operational procedures would seem more amenable
to change, such as deciding on tests during the service life when
the original plan had been to treat the weapon as a wooden bomb.
But changing operational procedures in mid-life for a complex
logistics system may entail very real and large costs.
The aspect of uncertainty seems most important in the plans
for testing. In general, if one believes the prediction of constant,
low dormant failure rate X
,
checkout testing would not make sense
until considerable time had elapsed since production because it
would give little payoff. Essentially, the payoff is low because
reliability for the lot can only be improved when bad devices are
found and corrected. For Poisson failures, a test "good" does
nothing to improve probability that the device will be good at
some time later. And few failures will have developed in a short
time (hazard product, X t
,
is low). If there were significant
This is called the property of "memorylessness" . For
failures which occur in a truly random fashion, a test "good"




degradation from testing, the result of a monitoring operation
too soon (small t.. ) would be degradation of reliability. The
only valid reason for very frequent monitoring operations then
would seem to be based on the likelihood of the stress factor in
the intervening phases of the FTS becoming large for some reason.
If this did happen, it would probably be due to a poor development
and qualification program for the equipment. Hopefully, stress
factors significantly above unity should only pertain for the flight
phase of an REB FTS.
Suppose one decides on a wooden bomb philosophy in an REB
development program based on a fairly low predicted dormant
failure rate and adopts a design which allows for no provisions for
test of the AFD in the field not for access to the AFD for repair
or replacement. Should information from the stockpile sampling or
operational test programs indicate a wholly unexpected reliability
degradation has occurred, the corrective action would then involve
essentially replacement of the entire REB. Let us simplify this
situation by saying that if things go as expected, the ex ante
average reliability,
R = 96% will pertain.
Recall that failure rate during any phase of index i
X. = k.u.
1 li
where k. is the stress factor and u. is the basic failure rate
under conditions defined as standard. The k.'s during missile
flight phases are very large compared to all other phases which
are usually considered unity so that only the basic failure rate
applies during non-flight phases. Events such as rough handling
or testing may induce failures at a rate larger than the basic
failure rate unless the equipment is rugged enough to withstand all
these non-flight environments. The occurrence of such induced





With some unexpected failure, and correction being very difficult
to effect, the resultant ex post average might be 40%. Then
consider that the utility for reliability is the shape shown in
Figure 8. The shape is derived from the following considerations.
From some level of significant damage capability marginal utility
increases rapidly until above some higher level - before we get
into our regime of reliability improvement effort - marginal
utility will decrease. The shape of the curve at very low levels
is not relevant here. If one assigned subjective probabilities
to the likelihood of average reliability being the predicted 96%
or the unpredicted almost complete failure of a component to
occur, based on experience with programs of similar complexity,
the judgment might be
:
p = 5% that R = 40%
1 - p = 95% that R = 96%.
Then in a manner analogous to an insurance/betting utility analysis,
treating reliability units as money, the internal average,
p • (40%) + (1 - p) • (95%) = 93.2%,
represents the certainty equivalent of this program. But the
utility shape is for one who prefers insurance, and the construction
in Figure 8 shows one would be willing to pay an insurance premium,
the difference between 93.2% and 76%, to hedge against the
catastrophic 40% result. Converting all calculations into monetary















FIGURE 8. UTILITY OF RELIABILITY
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values that one could make provisions for field test and repair
at a cost which would not use up all the allowance for insurance
1
premium.
Another way of hedging against the unpredicted failure mode
is to use a redundant channel, utilizing different components
and operating on a different physical principle. This reduces
the likelihood of catastrophic reduction of reliability from
unpredicted failures in a major way, but it does not eliminate
the possibility.

V. ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
If one had conducted an analysis along the lines indicated,
could the questions raised in Section IA now be answered? It is
apparent that there can be no answers which hold universally.
Every weapon system must be studied on its own merits in much
detail. Thus, we should avoid institutional arrangements that
dictate test and maintenance philosophy before all the facts are
known or lead to reliability specifications which are difficult
to change for over-all benefit as the program progresses. Based
on the REB example considered herein, we can make some general
assertions concerning the questions if we stipulate enough
conditions on each conclusion.
(1) There are certainly powerful inducements for decreeing
that a wooden bomb be produced. Estimation of the present value
of the cost of an involved test and maintenance activity over
the service life of the weapon system will probably show up as
a large sum whose avoidance looks very attractive. And the
chance that any reliability payoff might be negative regardless
of monetary cost if the wrong design alternatives or test procedures
are selected is a discouraging outlook. The decision should
depend on setting the marginal utility of average reliability
equal to the marginal cost of obtaining it. If an agency finds
the wooden bomb best on one program, it should not necessarily
decree it as policy on all other programs. On the other hand,




of arbitrary policy. This latter possibility is seen to be
likely where program responsibility is split between semi -autonomous
development and logistics commands. The logistics command tends
to plan extensive maintenance activities for some reliability
improvement without a clear picture of the over-all cost-benefit
situation. The agency making decisions should have responsibilities
which span the entire life of the weapon system.
(2) Chapter III herein covered the analysis concerning
the nature and frequency of tests. The alternatives are many
and complex, but external constraints of the system may in actuality
limit the choices severely. Tests in general will be done when
the REB is available at little cost. The nature of the tests
should be dictated by the attempt to insure a correct answer to
the question of good or bad. But this is a tradeoff with limiting
degradation from the test procedure. From the monitoring operations
there is the byproduct of some information leading to forecast
of the approach of the wearout period. This should probably not
be a significant factor in deciding the frequency of these system
tests. This statement is made on the assumption that it takes
a much more thorough intensive (probably destructive) examination
to detect impending wearout conditions than would be efficient
for a monitoring operation which had the purpose of detecting
failures which have already occurred. The stockpile sampling




(3) The values postulated in our analysis would say that
one should hedge against unexpected failure modes in conjunction
with the wooden bomb concept and pay the cost for a removable
functional device. This would not necessarily be true for a
lower cost weapon or one where the logistic cost of replacement
of the entire weapon were smaller.
(4) This thesis indicates several considerations for
lowering a reliability goal previously set without proper considera-
tion of all economic factors. Neglect of economic analysis seems
to suggest likelihood of the reliability goal being set too high.
The many unknown factors and iterative calculations called for
make proper decision seem very difficult, but in actuality there
may be only a fairly small number of practical alternatives from
which to choose. Again, a development agency with over-all
program responsibility is suggested as a desirable institutional
arrangement because of the necessity for authority to change
reliability goals without undue administrative delay as new
information becomes available.
(5) The last question, whether to develop a functional
device based on a different physical principle, is really not
different from consideration of other design alternatives except
for the higher uncertainty attendant to a research program. For
a given system effectiveness, the present value of the cost of
the two programs is compared. However, the use of arbitrary rules
rather than rational economic reasoning could dictate the wrong
alternative. For example, if an agency had decreed the wooden
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bomb concept for the entire service life in conjunction with a
strict minimum reliability specification, an electronic device
might be ruled out on technical feasibility grounds even though
its choice might be a better alternative if a few maintenance
cycles were allowed.
In summary, we have indicated in simple terms a rationale
for the application of economic analysis to a very complex technical
problem. The following quotation from Joan Robinson seems
appropriate
:
The analysis can be extended to any degree of refine-
ment, but the more complicated the question the more
cumbersome the analysis. In order to know anything it
is necessary to know everything, but in order to talk
about anything it is necessary to neglect a great deal. [l7]

APPENDIX 1
GENERALIZED LAGRANGE MULTIPLIER METHOD
A. Background
The method suggested in Chapter II for solving the problem
of optimum allocation of reliability improvement activities is
a simple application of the Generalized Lagrange Multiplier
Method explained in reference 13 . The basic framework of
the method will be outlined in this appendix in terms of the
problem in this thesis.
The data for this problem would not normally be in the form
of dif ferentiable functions but a set of cost estimates corresponding
to several discrete intensity levels of each activity. This use
of Lagrange multipliers constitutes a technique whose goal is
maximization of the total reliability improvement subject to
a cost constraint. The domain of the function to be maximized
is the set of reliability improvements possible, choosing one
intensity level from each improvement activity.
B. Formulation
In our problem we have set up four different activities of
index, i = 1 to 4. For each we can select an intensity level
which would by itself result in a reliability improvement of
X. = 1, 2, or 3%. The set of possible strategies consists of
i
all possible combinations of these activity levels. The over-all




function. Corresponding to the intensity level of each activity
there is a cost, C, which pertains if that activity were the
only one employed. The total cost, C, of any strategy is called
the resource function. The problem to be solved is maximization
of the payoff subject to a constraint on the resource.
As a subclass of the general problem, our problem is called
a cell or separable problem in that the activities are considered
to be independent of each other (over the small range of variables
in question) such that the over-all payoff is the sum of the
individual payoffs, and the over-all cost is the sum of the
individual costs. The problem to be solved in this case is to
find a strategy, one intensity level from each activity, which
maximizes the reliability improvement subject to a constraint
on cost
:
Maximize: X = /]x .
Subject to: V*C . = C.
C. Main Theorem
The main theorem of reference 13 in our terminology and
for only one constraint is as follows: Given that
(1) All Lagrange multipliers, m , are nonnegative
real numbers




then it follows that S* maximizes X over all strategies such
that C < C(S")
.
This theorem says that for any choice of nonnegative m, if
a maximum of the unconstrained Lagrangean function
X -mC
can be found, then the solution is a solution to the constrained
maximization problem where the constraint is the cost expended
in achieving the unconstrained solution. According to the theorem,
one can simply choose an arbitrary set of nonnegative m t s, find
an unconstrained maximum of the modified payoff function, X -mC,
and one has as a result a solution to a constrained problem.
Different choices of m t s lead to different cost levels. The
method does not guarantee that an answer can be found, but asserts
that if an answer can be found it will indeed be optimum.




for each activity independently of strategy choices in other
activities, and summing the payoffs aid costs for each activity
(for the strategy that maximized the Lagrangean for that activity) ;
results in maximizing £ X . with cost constraint equal to X! C j_>
both summations over the strategy produced by the procedure.
The theorem says nothing about the manner in which one
obtains the maxima of the unconstrained Lagrangean functions.
In our case where we do not have analytic functions it cannot
be done by finding zeroes of derivatives. It is done in this





ACTIVITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT OF INITIAL RELIABILITY
From the categorization in Section ID of all processes for
reliability improvement, four activities are chosen as particularly
applicable to initial (when new) reliability. The four are
discussed below as applied to the case of an electronic arming
and fuzing device (AFD) in the re-entry body (REB) of a strategic
missile
.
(1) Reduction of AFD Complexity
The AFD was made complex to provide a level of accuracy in
sensing height of burst (HOB) above target. The very nature
of electronic device failure rate versus complexity then dictates
a lower reliability than a less complex device. The HOB accuracy
contributes to determination of a radius of effect (Rp) for
warhead explosive yield to kill a target of given hardness.
Accuracy in terms of the circular error probable (CEP) of the
burst is also affected because of the interaction between HOB
dispersion and the re-entry trajectory. R^ and CEP together
determine the probability of kill (P ) for a single target
-|2 X
JRE/CEP . Thus the functional relations exist for
= 1
calculating opportunity costs due to decreased PK from lov ering
complexity if we assign a worth to the REB and also decide on how





Sophisticated methods looking at effectiveness over a complete
target complex may be dictated. In lowering complexity there will
be an offsetting saving (to the opportunity costs) in pecuniary
costs of development and production, but they may not be too
significant in comparison. (It should be noted that increased
complexity can result in higher reliability if the complexity
is required to overcome an enemy countermeasure environment. We
are assuming that increased complexity is only for the purpose of
improving performance - better accuracy, given no failure.)
(2) Redundancy
The design options under this activity involve putting entire
functional channels in parallel with the basic series functional
circuit or selected components or groups of components in parallel
with others. Components with suspected high fallibility would of
course be selected for redundancy. The entire channel redundancy
is normally a choice between single or dual because the marginal
return in reliability rapidly becomes very small and may even go
negative due to cross-channel failure paths. We are assuming
here the channel or component is duplicated with another identical
one. Consideration of using a different type functional circuit
as a redundant one involves hedging against uncertainty in predicting
reliability and will be discussed in Chapter IV. The major costs
of this activity are likely to be the opportunity costs represented
by the weight and space allocation robbed from the warhead which
would result in lower explosive yield. Since Rp is roughly
proportional to W where W = yield of warhead, the
opportunity cost can be calculated as done for activity #1. The
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pecuniary costs in this case would be additive rather than off-
setting but probably not too significant. (Another possible
cost is in the area of nuclear safety, the provision of low
probability of an unwanted detonation, and should be mentioned.
It is sometimes assumed that increased reliability means reduced
safety because a series of functional safety devices would indeed
imply reduced reliability compared to their simple removal. However,
much can be done in the way of devices which serve both operating
and safety functions, and it is by no means clear that a prolifera-
tion of series elements will insure maximum safety. In any event
an almost absolute safety criterion is enforced for any design
option. Any differences in probability of unwanted detonation
between different designs are essentially not calculable - the
differences between very small numbers. The cost of an unwanted
nuclear detonation is unknown except to say it is unacceptably
high. Significant costs for providing safety are difficult to
separate from the other costs of development. For these reasons
an estimate of costs involving safety will not be included.)
(3) Provision for Integrated Test in Manufacture
From the standpoint of efficiency in packaging the functional
parts in the REB - where efficiency means allowing more weight
and space allocation for the warhead and more freedom of design
for the REB structure - it is generally better to split up the AFD
and tuck it here and there to best utilize the available locations.
But this splitting up means addition of cable runs with inherent
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fault potentials and a very much more difficult job of testing the
AFD during development, evaluation, and qualification programs
in its operational configuration. Thus to gain reliability in
a design which is not single unit, we can choose designs which
come closer to being single unit. As in activity #2 the robbing
of space and weight allocation will result in lower yield. The
effect might even be severe enough to decrease accuracy due to
limitations on REB structure design options which would influence
aerodynamic characteristics during re-entry. In any event the
opportunity costs due to reduced P can be calculated. One would
expect some offsetting savings in the test programs. Experience
on earlier designs should enable engineers to make reasonable
estimates of the AR to be gained from different degrees of movement
toward a single unit design.
(4) Manufacturing and Quality Control
This activity would apply to a design resulting from any
combination of intensity levels in the first three activities.
It would consist of actions such as
:
(a) Use of high reliability parts, attained by careful
design, intensive controls during manufacture, extensive testing
for statistical confidence in the design, and screening manufactured
parts by complete testing of parameters.
(b) Intensive process controls during manufacture
and quality control tests of the end item.
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The costs of this activity are the pecuniary costs of different
intensity levels. Actually the cost for a given AR would be
dependent on what combination of the first three activities was
embodied in the design and program changes proposed. On the other
hand, over a limited range of design and program changes, considering
the C. versus X. relationship for this activity as independent of
the other activities might not be a bad approximation, bearing
in mind we are looking at limited changes to a basic program which
already includes a considerable amount of this kind of activity.
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